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training in Spain. We focus on the following questions: (1) Are there 
appreciable differences between firms which provide training and firms which 
do not? (2) Does the proportion of workers who receive training have a 
significant effect on firms' productivity and wages? In seeking quantitative 
answers to these relatively unexplored questions, we use a sample of sorne six 
hundred medium- and large-sized firms. Our main results indicate that larger 
firms and those undergoing technological change are more likely to provide 
their work force with formal training. By estimating a production function, 
we also find evidence of the positive and significant effects of formal 
training on labor productivity and wages. However, when training is treated 
as an endogenous variable the specified production function or the wage 
equation, such positive effects are no longer significant • 
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l. Introduction 
Much analysis has focused upon the individual's decision to invest in 
human capital and its consequent effects on earnings. 1 Yet, we know little 
about the determinants and effects of formal training, when provided by 
employers and analyzed from the perspective of firms. 2 While most developed 
countries have implemented household surveys to obtain information on 
schooling and earnings, and less frequently on job training, questions related 
to human capital investment are rarely included in establishment surveys. The 
dearth of data can partly explain the absence of empirical research on firm's 
decision to provide formal training and the effect of that training on 
economic performance. 
An important difference between a person's decision to invest in 
education and an organization's decision to invest in training is that the 
period of expected return is more uncertain for the organization. Discouraged 
by such an uncertainty, sorne firms refrain from making any training commitment 
and opt to rely on the educational system at large or on other firms in 
obtaining trained workers. Otherwise, the relationship between the employer 
and the trainee in bearing the costs and reaping the benefits of undertaking 
training becomes paramount. 3 
Two questions are relevant: First, are there appreciable differences 
between firms which provide training and firms which do not? Second, does 
training have a significant effect on productivity and wages?4 The first 
question can be illustrated where the typical firm assesses the costs against 
the returns of training its workers. We observe an absence of training when 
the firm finds that providing it turns out to be virtually unprofitable. The 
I See Hincer (1974), Lillard and Tan (1986), Barron et al. (1987) and 
Lynch (1989). 
2 Bartel (1989) is one exception which analyzes company-based training by 
using an econometric framework where the firm is the unit of analysis. Bishop 
et al. (1985) analyzes a firm-based data set containing training information 
only on the most recently hired employees. 
3 Becker (1862) and oi (1962) stress the role of firm-specific elements 
in the relationship between the employer and the trainee. 
4 In this article, we refer to training as that provided through 
organized courses or programs within the firmo 
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second question addresses the core of the current debate on productivity and 
economic performance.' 
It is often pointed out that workers in entry-level jobs who receive 
training in the workplace, and senior employees who experience an environment 
of continuous learning, are more flexible in performing tasks that present 
frequent contingencies. Moreover, labor psychologists emphasize that people's 
better understanding of their jobs makes them more responsible and satisfied 
at work. In a world of fast-paced technological change, the necessity of 
training is deemed to be enhanced: multiple skills, teamwork, responsibility 
and cooperation on the shopfloor are increasingly gaining terrain in more 
advanced enterprises. 6 These same ~ values in human resources development 
critically depend upon well-educated and trained employees. 
In order to obtain a quantitative response to the former two questions, 
we use 1989 training data provided by medium- and large-sized firms in Spain. 
We first ascertain the characteristics of the firms which provide training, as 
opposed to those which do noto We then analyze the effect training has on 
labor productivity, as measured by sales as well as by value added per 
employee. Finally, we estimate wage equations to ascertain the relationship 
between training and firms' average wage. Our results indicate that larger, 
more capital-intensive and foreign-owned firms are the most likely to provide 
r 
training. Moreover, firms undergoing technological change, employing workers 
in higher occupational categories, practicing profit-sharing and more 
intensively using some forms of public employment-training programs are also 
more likely to train their workers than are other firms. More importantly, we 
find evidence showing that the proportion of senior employees receiving 
training has a positive effect on labor productivity and wages. However, when 
training is treated as an endogenous variable in our specified production 
function and wage equation, its positive effects on productivity and wages 
become insignificant. 
, See, for instance, Dertouzos et al. (1989). 
6 Favorable task planning, adequate incentives and a satisfactory 
compensation system become some of the necessary complements to a motivated 
and productive labor force. 
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In the following seetion, we develop the framework. In seetion 111, we 
explain some relevant features of the institutional eontext in Spain. We offer 
a deseription of the data in seetion IV. In seetion V, we present estimations 
and diseuss the results. Finally, in seetion VI, we draw some eonelusions. 
11. COncep~ual and Bapirical Fr..ework 
What underlies a firm's deeision to provide its employees with training? 
Among those whieh do, what determines the intensity of training provided? The 
problem can be formulated in terms of the typieal profit-maximizing firmo 
Sinee training expenditures represent a eost for the firm, the amount of 
training per employee will be sueh that the marginal eost equals the marginal 
return, where the latter is the inerease in the average produet per worker for 
eaeh unit of training provided. In a life-eyele approaeh, the equilibrium 
implies that the marginal return on a eurrent expenditure in training equals 
the diseounted sum of sueeessive inereases in the average produet of labor 
over employees' time with the firm.' 
The first issue to be eonsidered is whether or not the eompany provides 
formal training. Indeed, for sorne firms we observe the absenee of formal 
training. Thereafter, we can assess the intensity of training by examining the 
proportion of workers who reeeive training, firms' expenditures and/or other 
indieators of how mueh training is provided. Nevertheless, if training 
inereases the quality of employees' work performance, we might ask ourselves 
why it is that some firms do not train their workers. Aeeording to the model 
of profit maximization, one possible reason eould be that, in the non-training 
firms, the average output per worker is highly unresponsive to expenditures in 
training. 8 
We make a distinetion between training reeeived by junior employees 
(newly hired workers) and training reeeived by senior employees (retraining). 
, Keasuring the firms's return to training through output exeludes any 
observable improvement in its produet quality. Sueh improved quality may not 
neeessarily be refleeted in priee if the industry is highly competitive and 
the firm's goal is to gain an edge in the market. 
8 Koreover, informal on-the-job training may be a better substitute for 
formal training in these firms. 
-------_._--
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This dietinction ie relevant for several reasons. First, the amount of 
training devoted to junior employees is associated with firms' level of 
employment creation. Second, the effect of both types of training on 
productivity and wages may differ in correlation with reasons for and nature 
of the training courees offered. Third, the majority of employees who receive 
training is concentrated among those workers who have been with the firm for a 
longer period of time (retraining).9 Four, retraining can be a basic need of 
the firm in order to implement technological change and make use of its 
internal labor market. 
Among factors affecting the responsiveness of output to the amount of 
training, we consider the following: (1) The size of the firm: it is well 
known that job turnover is lower among larger f irms, 10 so that the employer 
can reap the benefits of training in the long termo It is also true that more 
training in larger firms leads to longer job tenure. 1l Moreover, larger firms 
may regard training as a way to reduce monitoring costs. (2) Intensity of 
capital: since the complexity of tasks, i.e. operation of machinery by 
workers, is greater among capital-intensive companies, these are expected to 
require a more qualified labor force. (3) Technological change: a new product 
and/or production process requires enhanced or new skills. The degree of 
success in implementing euch technological change depends upon the 
adaptability of workers to deal with novelty in the workplace. (4) Formal 
education of employees: the effectiveness of training on work performance 
greatly depends upon the capacity of workers to learn and use that knowledge. 
This capacity is increased by workers' higher levels of formal education. A 
more educated worker thus makes more valuable the firm's investment in 
training. (5) Management: a well managed company has greater success in 
9 The firm's uncertainty with respect to reaping the benefits of training 
might be lower when training is directed to senior employees who have shown a 
longstanding commitment to the company. 
w See Oi (1983a). 
11 The negative effect of turnover on firm-supported training is twofold: 
It implies the loss of the investment by the firm, and impedes higher work 
efficiency as a result of further training received by the same worker. 
r- , 
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developing its human resources. 12 (6) Characteristics of employment contracts: 
as we will describe in the following section, Spanish labor law offers an 
interesting menu of employment arrangements, some of which contemplate or 
enforce the provision of training by the firmo (7) Product competition: the 
intensity of domestic competition, and whether or not the firm competes in 
international markets. (8) The degree of workers' commitment to the firm: this 
is assumed to relate to the degree of employees' participation in decision-
making, and whether or not there is a profit-sharing agreement with the 
company. (9) Turnover rate: high turnover rates discourage the company from 
investing in training. It is also likely that specific training is an 
incentive for workers' long-term employment with the same firmo 
We will analyze these and other factors as they relate to firm-based 
training in two different ways: First, by using a probit model in which the 
outcome variable indicates whether or not the firm provided any training at 
all and whether or not a particular type of training was provided. Second, by 
applying a tobit analysis in which the dependent variable is either the 
proportion of junior employees or the proportion of senior employees who 
received training within the firmo 
Training, Labor Productivity and Wages 
To ascertain the effects of formal training on employees' productivity, 
we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with two inputs: capital, K, 
and effective labor, L. Effective labor measures the increase in the quality 
of labor as a result of training: 13 
(1 ) L = R e(1I + br) 
12 Our only observable indicator with respect to the firm's management 
characteristics is ownership. 
13 This methodology has been used to address the labor productivity effect 
of schooling (Griliches 1970), research and development (Griliches and 
Mairesse 1984) and training (Bartel 1989). A Cobb-Douglas production function 
has proved to be useful, sometimes under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale. 
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where R is the number of workers employed, t and r are, respectively, the 
proportions of junior and senior employees receiving training, and a and b 
indicate the training effects on the quality of labor. So long as a and b are 
positive numbers, it is clear in equation [1] that more training leads to more 
effective labor. The production function can be written as 
(2) 
By substituting [1] into [2] results in 
(3 ) 
Equation [3] can be expressed in terms of output per worker: 
(4) O/R = AKcr~.1 e po. + /Jbr 
By taking logarithms, the equation to be estimated becomes the following 
(error term omitted): 
(5) ln (O/R) = ln A + aln K + (p-1)ln R + pat + pbr 
This equation provides the basic framework that allows us to address the 
effect of formal training on labor productivity. In addition, we investigate 
how training is related to wages. Training is deemed to link wages with 
productivity. In fact, the lack of a objective measure over productivity has 
made the assessment of the effect of training on productivity possible only in
.. 
terms of its effect on wages. By using data drawn from a cross-section samp1e 
of medium- and large-sized firms in Spain, we are able to compare the results 
of estimating the effect of training on both productivity and average wage. 
111. In.ti~u~ional COn~ex~1 ~raining and Appr.n~ic••bip COn~r.c~. 
Unemployment in Spain began to rise in the mid-seventies and peaked in 
1985, when almost 22% of the labor force were jobless. Since then, employment 
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has steadily increased, notably through fixed-term (temporary) employrnent 
contracts. Spain's recent labor market developments highlight the 
institutional conditions in which firms have operated over the last five 
years. By understanding those conditions, we better assess their possible 
effects on company-based training. 
Convinced that high unemployrnent was caused by rigid employment 
relationships and an exceedingly expensive labor force, by the end of 1984 the 
Spanish government established the Employrnent Promotion Programs. Extensive 
economic measures were implemented: sorne were aimed at making labor more 
flexible through temporary and part-time contracts. other measures were 
intended to lower the costs of new hires by way of subsidies, reductions in 
Social Security contributions and corporate income tax reliefs. While the 
measures to increase flexibility in hiring and firing applied to all workers, 
those accompanied by economic incentives were targeted for the benefit of 
specific groups: youth, long-term unemployed adult workers, disabled persons 
and women in underrepresented occupations. 
In the status of the legislation as of 1988, two types of fixed-term 
contracts are particularly relevant to this work: training contracts and 
apprenticeship contracts. J4 These contracts were intended to ease the entry of 
youth into the labor market. They can be extended for a minimum of three 
months and a maximum of three years. The training contract (contrato en 
pr4cticas) is only applicable within the first four years following graduation 
from an academic or vocational institution. Its objective is primarily to 
place the worker in a job in which he or she can apply the professional 
training previously received. J5 on the other hand, the apprenticeship contract 
(contrato para la formación) was conceived as a way to complement work with 
training. Only workers between 16 and 20 years are eligible for apprenticeship 
14 These types of contracts were already contemplated in the Workers 
Statute of 1980, but under more limited conditions. Since the legislation has 
been modified several times, the description that follows is based on its  
status in 1988. 
l' In 1988, one major restriction placed on eligibility for training 
contracts was that the worker must be a first time job seeker, unemployed for 
at least two years. 
8 
contracts. The time devoted to training must be from one fourth to one half of 
the total time considered in the contract, and the worker is compensated only 
for hours of effective work. 
The economic incentives for firms to implement these contracts are the 
following: (1) Training contracts reduce employers' contributions to the 
Social Security by 75\, and are proportionately subsidized in sums ranging 
from 120,000 pts. ($1,200) to 280,000 pts. ($2,800), depending on their 
initial duration. (2) Apprenticeship contracts lower the employers' 
contributions to the Social Security by 90\, or even 100\ if the firm has 
fewer than 25 employees." Apprenticeship contracts are subsidized at 90 pts. 
per training hour per worker when that training is provided by the employer 
through a program approved by the government employment office, INEM (National 
Institute of Employment). 
IV. Data 
The data we use in this study are drawn from a yearly survey carried out 
since 1977 by the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Finance, entitled 
"Collective Bargaining in the Large Firms" (hereinafter NCGE).16 Its main 
objective is to follow the evolution of collective bargaining in medium- and 
large-sized firms in Spain. The NCGE survey includes companies with 200+ 
workers l1 and contains detailed information about their economic 
characteristics and industrial relations practices. The questionnaires are 
sent to the company executives who, in many cases, have developed computerized 
methods in responding to survey questions. In the last five years, the average 
number of companies to which yearly questionnaires were sent amounted to 
2,000, and the average response rate per year has been higher than 30\. 
16 I thank Antonio Garcla de Blas, Luis Albentosa, Valeriano Mu~oz and 
Julio S6nchez, of the Director General's Office of Political Economy, for 
their help in providing these data.  
11 Due to employment adjustments, about 5\ of the firms in the sample had 
fewer than 200 employees in 1988. Approximately 53\ of the firms had fewer 
than 500 workers, 24\ had more than 1,000, 4\ had more than 5,000, and only 
six firms exceeded 20,000 employees. The largest company employed 64,148 
workers in 1988. 
_._..__._------
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The NCGZ survey provides detailed information on economic sector, company 
ownership, percentage of output exported, sales, value added, stock value of 
fixed capital, number of employees, average number of hours worked per 
employee, year-round hires and dismissals, professional categories and other 
variables regarding collective bargaining practices. Moreover, sorne aspects 
pertaining to the company's implementation of new technologies are reported. 
In 1988, the NCGZ survey incorporated questions pertaining to human 
resources practices for the firet time. In 1989, those questione were refined 
and others, addressing technological changes within the firm, were added. The 
following questions related to training were asked of all the firms in 1989: 
(1) How many workers in entry-level jobs have attended training eourses 
in 19881 
(2) How many senior workers have attended training courses in 19881 18 
The sample we use includes sorne six hundred firms. It is fairly 
representative of the non-agricultural firms having 200+ employees in Spain. 
This firm size segment comprised about 35\ of the total non-agricultural 
employrnent in 1988. Our sample of firms employed a total of approxirnately 
930,000 workers, representing almost 45\ of the labor force employed by non-
agricultural firms having 200+ employees. Other characteristics, like firm 
distribution by size, sectors, ownership and geographical location, are close 
to those of firms with 200+ employees. 
Although Spanish employrnent is mainly concentrated among small firms, it 
is difficult to obtain information from these often economically at risk 
establishments. The availability of data on larger firms permits us to improve 
our understanding of the primary source of economic leadership. Needless to 
say, medium- and large-sized firms tend to employ an important proportion of 
the Spanish labor force. 
18 Two other questions were also included in the 1989 questionnaire: (a) 
How many hours per worker were devoted to training in 19881 (b) What was the 
cost of training courses attended by workers in 19881 The firms' difficulty in 
answering these questions, reflected in the frequency of missing values, 
induced us to set them aside for future analysis. 
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In this section we offer empirical evidence in addressing three questions 
as they relate to formal training provided by medium- and large-sized firms in 
Spain: (1) What determines firm-based training? (2) Does training have a 
significant effect on average output per worker? (3) Does training affect the 
average wage within the company? 
We note that approximately 59\ of the companies in our sample provided 
formal training in 1988, and the average percentage of workers involved 
amounted to 15.9\, 83\ of whom were senior employees (see Appendix). 
Probability of Firm-Based Training 
Table 1 displays the results of estimating the effects of a number of 
factors on the probability of firm-based training. The first three columns 
present estimates of a probit modelo The dependent variable takes on one if 
any firm-based formal training existed in 1988 (column 1), if any junior 
employees received training in 1988 (column 2), and if any senior employees 
received training in the referred year (column 3). Zero applies otherwise. The 
fourth and fifth columns present the results of a tobit model in which the 
dependent variable is defined as the proportion of junior employees who have 
received training (column 4) and likewise for senior employees (column 5).19 
The results reflected in Table 1 support the hypothesis indicated in 
section II.~ Namely, larger, more capital-intensive and foreign companies are 
19 Junior and senior employee proportions are taken over each firm's total 
number of employees. 
~ Our discussion in section 11 has served as a guide in choosing the 
explanatory variables included in the regressions. They can be described as 
follows: (1) size of the firm: log number of amployees; (2) intansity of 
capital: value of the fixed capital stock per amployee; (3) technological 
change: a dummy which takes on one if the firm has launched a new product or 
implemented a new production process; (4) occupational distribution of 
employees: fraction of high-level managers, fraction of medium- and lower-
level managers and fraction of clerical workers; (5) management: we identify 
managerial characteristics by private, public or foreign ownership (capital
ownership is defined by existing control of 50\ or more of capital)¡ (6) 
characteristics of labor contracts: fraction of temporary contracts existing 
as of 7/31/88, fraction of newly hired temporary workers, and fractions of 
those newly temporary workers who have training and apprenticeship contracts 
as referred to in 1988; (7) competition: fraction of output exported. (8) 
workers' commitment: fraction of employees covered by a profit-sharing 
agreement; (9) turnover rate: hires plus dismissals over size of the firm; 
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more like1y to provide training. Furthermore, companies experiencing 
techno10gica1 change, exporting a greater proportion of output, having more 
emp10yees in higher occupations and practicing sorne form of profit-sharing are 
indicated to be more 1ikely to train their labor force. 21 An interesting 
finding, although not eurprising, is that thoee firme which have hired a 
relatively greater number of temporary workers under training contracts are 
more likely to have provided their employees with training regardless of the 
dependent variable definition. When the dependent variable in the tobit model 
is defined as the proportion of junior employees who have received training, 
the proportion of fixed-term contracts among the firm's total number of 
employees and the proportion of apprenticeship contracts among newly hired 
workers obtain positive and significant coefficients.~ 
Also, by estimating tobit models, we are able to highlight sorne 
differences between the factors which determine the type of training provided. 
The capital-labor ratio, the distribution of employees by occupations and the 
proportion of sharing-profit employees within the company are very significant 
in explaining the proportion of senior employees who received training. The 
same variables are insignificant in explaining the proportion of junior 
employees who received training. D The previous results are consistent with 
the hypotheses advanced in section 11. Furthermore, such results indicate that 
the public employment-training policy has been effective in fostering firms' 
provision of training to younger workere. Nonetheless, we suggest a more 
(10) finally, nine economic sectors are considered. 
21 We also ran OLS regressions in which the dependent variables 
represented the proportions of workers who were trained. The results were 
similar to those obtained with the probit and tobit models. 
~ Note that, in all the regression, we have controlled for the relative 
weight of fixed-term emp10yment contracts among firms' overall employment and 
among newly hired workers. By newly hired workers, we refer to thoee who have 
been hired throughout 1988. 
D Only 2\ of newly hired workers with a temporary contract are of the 
apprenticeship variety; whereas, the proportion of training contracts among 
newly hired temporary workers amounts to 17\. It is to be noted that, in this 
sample of medium- and large-sized firms, the percentage of temporary contracts 
among newly hired workers is 64\ and the percentage of temporary contracts 
within those company payrolls is about 12\ (see Appendix). 
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probing analysis to reach further conclusions on this particular an important 
issue. 
The Effect of Training on Labor Productivity and Hages 
Equation [5] constitutes the basic specification of the production 
function to be estimated. He first attempted its estimation by using the 
ordinary least-square methodology. The results are presented in Table 2. He 
have considered two measures for the firm's output per employee: sales per 
employee and value added per employee. Two variables are deemed to reflect the 
intensity of training: the proportions of junior employees and of senior 
employees who, respectively, participated in training courses, as reported by 
the company. Alternatively, we use a dummy to indicate the existence or not of 
firm-based training according to any type of employee training. The variable 
capital (K) is the value of the fixed capital stock, and the variable labor 
(R) is the number of employees. 
The results recorded in Table 2 show strong support for a positive effect 
of training on labor productivity, although such an effect takes place only 
through the proportion of senior employees who received formal training. The 
coefficients for the proportion of junior employees who received formal 
training are insignificant (columns 1 and 3 of Table 2). Furthermore, there is 
clear evidence of constant returns to scale in the estimated production 
function: a=.26 and P=-.31+1=.69. The same results hold when the dependent 
variable is taken as log value added. Also, it is to be noted that the 
coefficients for the proportions of senior employees who received training are 
very close to the coefficients for the log of number of employees plus one; 
meaning that b, the effect of this type of training on the quality of labor, 
, 
is approximately one. 
The high estimated coefficient of the variable reflecting the firm's 
training provided to senior employees suggests the existence of bias in the 
estimated effect of training on the firm's productivity. A primary cause for 
bias can be the omission of relevant variables in the determination ef firms' 
eutput. 
13 
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Table 3 presents the results of estimating the specified production 
function controlling for other variables that may affect productivity. When we 
control for other variables, the coefficient for the proportion of senior 
employees who received training remains positive but significant only at a 10\ 
level, diminishing from .77 to .29 where the dependent variable is log value 
added. This result is not surprising, as the variables added up in equation 
[51 are highly correlated with the percentage of workers attending training 
courses, as seen in Table 1. 
Some results with regard to the added variables are worthy of mention. We 
find that foreign-owned firms and, above all, those with more employees in 
high occupational categories have higher average productivity than comparable 
firms.~ The three categories reflecting the occupational distribution of 
employees, namely, the fraction of employees in high-level management, medium-
lower-level management and clerical occupations (fraction of production 
workers omitted), are included in the regressions to control for the 
productivity effects of differences in the labor force quality which are not 
attributable to training.~ 
Another important source of bias can be the following: if the error term 
is correlated with the training variables, we obtain inconsistent estimates 
for the effect of training on productivity. This can happen if training is 
measured with error and/or if training is determined simultaneously with other 
independent variables, i.e., the occupational structure or labor force formal 
education. The firm's decision to invest in training and the selection of 
workers to receive training are likely to be related to its employees' 
education and occupational distribution. In such a case we cannot treat 
training as an exogenous variable and apply the OLS method. 
~ Note that the constant returns to scale of our estimated production 
function are enhanced when these additional variables are included in the 
regression. 
~ It is likely that training is linked to workers' promotion. By 
receiving training some employees have higher chances of ascending along their 
career ladder. In the NCGE, however, the occupational classification is partly 
based on employees' formal education. Specifically, employees occupying high-
level managerial positions are university-graduated and most medium- and 
lower-level managers possess three years of formal post-secondary education. 
---------------------------------
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In fact, the firm's benefit from training is enhanced when training is 
aimed at the emp10yees who have a greater capacity to learn and are so 
strategically placed in the company as to more effective1y apply their new 
skills. Furthermore, training can affect the occupational distribution of 
employees if those receiving training are promoted to higher-ranked 
occupations. We undertake this crucial problem by treating the proportion of 
senior employees who have received training as an endogenous variable. The 
fully specified production function is estimated by using the two-stage least-
square methodology. The instrument for the proportion of senior employees 
trained is whether or not the firm underwent technological change throughout 
1988. This variable is highly correlated with firm's provision of training and 
assumed to be independent of the error term in the production function. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 reflect the instrumental variable estimates. 
As expected, the effect of training on productivity becomes insignificant. If 
our IV results, based on a sample of medium- and large-sized firms in Spain, 
are correct, we can conclude that there is not an exogenous training effect on 
labor productivity when it is measured by value added. 
A possible reason for the former results is that we are unable to capture 
the effect of training on labor productivity with aggregate measures for both 
training and productivity. As oi (1983b) points out, " ••• firm-specific 
dimensions of workers' value to their employers are largely neglected in 
conventional measures of labor productivity. Reliance on conventional measures 
thus tends to understate the impact of firm-specific training on total labor 
productivity." 
The NCGE survey contains detailed information on wages, allowing us to 
analyze further the effect of firm-based training on labor productivity. We 
can do so if labor productivity and wages are highly correlated acress firms, 
and thus the average wage is a better indicator of workers' value to their 
employers than sales or value added per employee. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the results of estimating wage 
equations which are different from one another only with regard to the 
definition of the dependent variable: average annual wage and average hour 
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wage paid by the firm.~ The coefficient for the proportion of senior 
employees who received formal training is positive and significant as to both 
specifications. 
Other results indicate that the following characteristics or 
circumstances are associated with higher paying firms: larger, more capital-
intensive, higher rates of capacity utilization and a greater fraction of 
fixed-term contracts among newly hired workers. Furthermore, the following 
variables obtain a negative and significant coefficient: fraction of fixed-
term contracts within firms' payrolls, fraction of apprenticeship contracts 
among newly hired temporary workers and dummies indicating that the 
representatives of the Laborer Commissions (CCOO) or those of the General 
Union of Workers (UGT) are a majority at the bargaining table. n 
Once again, our estimates of formal training effects on the average wage 
paid by the firm can be biased if training is correlated with the wage 
equation error termo This may happen if higher wages are paid to workers who 
are more able and/or possess more general skills. These workers are the most 
likely to receive formal training within the firm because ability and general 
human capital are characteristics which heighten the desired effect of formal 
training on employees. The observed effect of formal training on average wage 
can be a consequence of the correlation between ability/general human capital 
and formal training/wages. To deal with this problem, we again resort to the 
instrumental variable methodology. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the results of re-estimating the wage 
equations by two-stage least square. As done previously, we instrument the 
proportion of senior employees who received training by a dummy variable which 
~ The NCGE survey reports the annual wage bill, the average number of 
hours worked during the year and the average number of employees (the sum of 
the number of employees at the end of each month divided by twelve). In 
equation 1, the average wage is the annual wage bill divided by the average 
number of employees. In equation 2, the wage measure is the average wage per 
hour, i.e., the annual wage bill divided by the total hours worked during the 
year.  
n CCOO and UGT are the two major unions in Spain. Their representatives 
and those of other worker organizations constitute the works councils in firms 
employing 50+ workers. With respect to employees, the bargaining table 
(negotiation commission) is formed under the works council agreement. It is 
composed of twelve to fifteen members. 
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indicates whether or not the firm experienced some form of technological 
change in 1988. 
The IV methodology applied leads to an insignificant coefficient for the 
training variable in both wage equations. Thus, no exogenous training effect 
is found on the average wage paid by the firm considering a sample of medium-
and large-sized firms in Spain. 
VI. COncluaiona 
This etudy has sought to highlight sorne central iesues related to firm-
based training in Spain, namely, what determines the exietence of training 
among medium- and large-sized firms and how training affects labor 
productivity and wages in these firms. Company provided training has special 
relevance in Spain, particularly when the country faces the imminent European 
Single Karket and productivity growth stands as a key aspect in improving the 
Spanish economy'scompetitiveness. 
Unfortunately, the lack of similar studies prevents uS from comparing our 
results with those obtainable for other countries. To summarize, we found 
noticeable differences between firms which provide and do not provide formal 
training. When estimating the effect of formal training on labor productivity 
and firm's average wage, no conclusive findings can be reported. Nevertheless, 
the evidence points to the absence of training effect on either productivity 
or wages when a simultaneity bias is taken into account. Thue, we have raised 
more questions than answers. A promising avenue for future research consists 
of investigating the relationship between firm-based training and workers' 
general human capital. Our work suggests that there are significant links 
between occupational structure, productivity and wages, making it difficult to 
estimate the relationship between formal training, productivity and wages by 
means of a conventional production function methodology. 
A question remains: are companies in Spain providing the adequate amount 
of training for their employees? This study has taken some initial steps 
toward exploring possible responses to this crucial question. Although we 
cannot report a robust relationship between formal training and productivity, 
we stress the importance of workers' general skills in driving firms' tendency 
17 
to provide formal training. The relationship between workers' general skills 
and firrn-provided specific training makes it difficult to disentangle the 
exogenous training effect on labor productivity and wages. 
18 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Firm-Based Training 
Probit Tobit 
(1) (2 ) (3) (4 ) (S) 
Log number .30758 .23240 .25558 .01808 .07000 
of employees (4.48) (3.96) (3.93) (2.60) (5.93) 
Log stock fixed .05244 .07082 .06301 .08162 .03672 
capit. per employee (0.98) (1. 29) (1.18 ) (1.18 ) (3.22) 
-1 if foreign .43778 .17031 .44175 .02835 .05269 
owned company (2.88) (1.16 ) (2.97) (1.57) (1.71) 
=1 if public .32704 -.16508 .48086 -.02203 .10492 
owned company (1. 52) (-0.81) (2.30) (-0.86) (2.57) 
=1 if technological .73159 .59961 .75752 .06879 .14824 
change took place (5.50) (4.92) (5.80) (4.60) (5.75) 
Fraction of .68645 .21352 .39290 .00169 .08186 
output exported (2.06) (0.69) (1.21) (0.04) (1. 26) 
Fraction of .41062 .82147 -.04161 .14717 .01097 
temporary employees (0.79) (1.57) (-0.08) (2.24) (0.09) 
Temporary employeesj -.17523 -.06782 -.08296 -.00607 .01908 
'- ~ 
newly hired workers (-0.87) (-0.33) (-0.41) (-0.23) (0.44) 
Training contractsj .59269 .50540 .63503 .08318 .11355 
newly hired (2.32) (2.15) (2.54) (2.90) (2.34) 
temporary workers 
Apprenticeship -.04526 .70510 -1.41997 .18142 -.25538 
contractsjnewly hired (-0.07) (1.15 ) (-1.77) (2.44) (-1.43) 
temporary workers 
Fraction of 2.61210 1.53652 1.80667 .22930 .30173 
high-level managers (3.65) (2.56) (2.85) (3.22) (2.47) 
Fraction of medium- 1.31771 .78546 1. 56199 .07872 .40076 
and lower-level (3.00) (1. 85) (3.61) (1. 48) (4.52) 
managers 
Fraction of 1. 57185 .79697 1. 83512 .11758 .51094 
clerical workers (2.18) (1. 22) (2.57) (1. 49) (3.81) 
Fraction of employees .67083 .33479 .75871 .02635 .08742 
sharing profits (2.74) (1. 77) (3.12) (1.17) (2.23) 
Table 1 (continued) 
Determinants of Firm-Based Training 
Probit  Tobit 
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (S) 
Turnover rate -.06154 -.00697 -.03950 .00981 -.01686 
(-0.44) (-0.04) (-0.28) (0.55) (-0.50) 
Constant -3.45936 -3.59227 -3.27114 -.40811 -1.00709 
(-4.93) (-5.03) (-4.71) (-4.48) -6.94) 
Sigma-square .01842 .06566 
(9.35) (12.05) 
N 595 595 595 595 595 
Log likelihood -303.8 -325.5 -308.8 -44.5 -162.4 
Notes: 1.  The dependent variables are: (1) =1 if any employees trained 
and zero otherwise; (2) -1 if any junior employees trained 
and zero otherwise; (3) -1 if any senior employees trained 
and zero otherwise; (4) proportion of junior employees 
trained; (S) proportion of senior employees trained. 
2. All equations include 8 sector durnmies. 
3. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Table 2 
The Effect of Training on Labor Productivity 
OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
-1 if existence of 
firm-based training 
Proportion of junior 
employees who received 
formal training 
Proportion of senior 
employees who received 
formal training 
Log number of 
employees 
Log stock of fixed 
capital value 
Constantr 
N 
R-square 
Note: t-statistics are 
----------_. 
Log Sales per 
Employee 
(1 ) (2) 
.28343 
(4.20) 
.34210 
.(0.79) 
.80526 
(4.97) 
-.30748 -.30244 
(-7.39) (-7.22) 
.25832 .26859 
(10.67) (11.13) 
7.59104 7.35826 
(29.39) (29.43) 
596 596 
.23 .22 
in parentheses. 
Log Value Added 
per Employee 
(3) (4) 
.23114 
(3.68) 
.27962 
(0.69) 
.77384 
(5.13) 
-.25359 -.24613 
(-6.58) (-6.30) 
.26037 .27275 
(11. 53) (12.06) 
6.23892 5.98391 
(25.97) (25.65) 
587 587 
.27 .25 
Table 3 
The Effect of Training on Labor Productivity
OLS and IV Estimates 
Table 3 (continued) 
The Effect of Training on Labor productivity
OLS and IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: 
Apprenticeship 
contracts/newly hired 
temporary workers 
Fraction of 
high-level managers 
Fraction of medium-
and lower-level 
managers 
Fraction of 
clerical workers 
Constant 
N 
R-square 
Log Sales per Log Value Added 
Employee per Employee 
OLS IV OLS IV 
-.55202 -.50673 -.26797 -.34420 
(-1.88) (-1.66) (-0.91) (-1. 09) 
1. 22154 1.18117 1.04254 1.11261 
(4.36) (4.06) (3.57) (3.57) 
1.18443 1.08409 .61041 .79111 
(6.18) (4.40) (3.13) (2.99) 
1.18841 .99613 .77333 1.10936 
(3.96) (2.37) (2.53) (2.48) 
-3.92803 -3.37787 -4.74940 -5.76984 
(-0.92) (-0.77) (-1.11) (-1.27) 
593 593 584 584 
.49 .48 .43 .38 
Notes: 1.  The instrument for the proportIon of senIor employees who 
received training is whether or not the firm underwent 
technological change throughout 1988. 
2. All equations include 8 sector dummies. 
3. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4 
The Effect of Training on Wages 
OLS and IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Wage 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of junior .20881 .22558 .16443 .28903 
emp10yees who received (1. 51) (1. 61) (0.79) (0.81) 
formal training 
Proportion of senior .16693 .15989 .26789 .16883 
employees who received (3.12 ) (2.95) (0.76) (0.80) 
formal training 
Log number of .01444 .02152 .00969 .01545 
employees (1. 43) (2.10) (0.50) (0.79) 
Log stock of fixed .04234 .04063 .04096 .03888 
capital per employee (4.92) (4.66) (4.16) (3.89 ) 
Rate of capacity .15185 .14033 .15512 .14452
,"
,-- utilization (2.81) (2.56) (2.80) (2.57) 
=1 if foreign .04141 .03608 .04158 .03630 
owned company (1. 66) (1. 42) (1. 66) (1. 42) 
=1 if public .01733 .03930 .01212 .03264 
owned company (0.52) (1.16 ) (0.32) (0.85) 
'. 
Fraction of -.27084 -.34262 -.26595 -.33635 
temporary contracts (-3.52) (-4.40) (-3.36) (-4.20) 
Temporary contracts/ .06333 .06322 .06095 .06017 
newly hired workers (1. 92) (1. 90) (1.79) (1. 74) 
Training contracts/ .05823 .04622 .05393 .04071 
newly hired (1. 46) (1.14 ) (1. 26) (0.94) 
temporary workers 
Apprenticeship -.32465 -.32003 -.31970 -.31370 
contracts/newly hired (-2.92) (-2.84) (-2.84) (-2.74) 
temporary workers 
,Table 4 (continued) 
The Effect of Training on Wages 
OLS and IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Wage 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) 
Fraction of .92242 .86103 .91527 .85188 
high-level managers (9.12) (8.40) (8.77) (8.04) 
Fraction of medium- .52925 .51301 .51298 .49219 
and lower-level managers (7.62 ) (7.30) (5.75) (5.44) 
Fraction of -.17798 -.18777 -.20914 -.22763 
clerical workers (-1.62) (-1.69) (-1.36) (-1.46) 
Fraction of workers .04409 .05626 .03820 .04873 
sharing profit (1.23) (1. 55) (0.92) (1.16 ) 
=1 if CCOO holding -.05488 -.05370 -.05344 -.05187 
majority at (-2.65) (-2.56) (-2.50) (-2.39) 
,. bargaining table
__o 
=1 if UGT holding -.07889 -.07984 -.07907 -.08008 
majority at (-3.42) (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.40) 
bargaining table 
Constant 7.26434 6.77257 7.29875 6.81657 
(61.41) (56.54) (43.65) (40.19) 
N 594 594 594 594 
R-square .55 .56 .54 .55 
Notes: 1.  See note 26 in text for an explanation on how the two 
dependent variables have been calculated. 
2.  The instrument for the proportion of senior employees who 
received training is whether or not the firm underwent 
technological change throughout 1988. 
3. All equations include 8 sector dummies. 
4 • t-statistics are in parentheses. 
._..~-~~-_._-------------------------
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Appendix 1 
Means and Standard Oeviations of the Sample 
All Firms Training No Training 
Variables 
el if firm-based 
training exists 
Proportion of junior 
employees who received 
formal training 
Proportion of senior 
employees who received 
formal training 
Log sales per employee 
Log value added 
per employee 
Log (wage billjnumber 
of employees) 
Log (wage billjtotal 
hours worked) 
Log number of employees 
Log stock of fixed capital 
Log (stock of fixed 
capitaljnumber of employees) 
Rate of capacity 
utilization 
Log hours worked during 
the year 
=1 if 50\+ foreign 
owned company
eO otherwise 
Mean Mean Mean 
(S.O) (S.O) (s.O) 
.58910 1 o 
( .492) 
.02697 .04578 o (.073) (.090) 
.13185 .22382 o 
(.215) (.241) 
9.46715 9.63013 9.23194 
(.863) (.846) ( .835) 
8.48488 8.63771 8.26293 
( .813) ( .797) ( .787) 
7.88206 7.97136 7.75387 
( .332) ( .294) ( .341) 
7.35662 7.44779 7.22521 
( .339) ( .305) ( .342) 
6.41559 6.68102 6.03504 
(1. 06) (1.14 ) ( .809) 
14.46090 14.93173 13.78444 
(1. 86) (1. 76) (1. 79) 
8.04817 8.25509 7.75088 
(1. 33) (1.19) (1. 46) 
.84306 .84476 .84064 
( .183) (.180) ( • 189) 
7.43431 7.43144 7.43844 
( .050) ( .050) ( .051) 
.25082 .31092 .16465 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix 1 (continued) 
Means and Standard Oeviations of the Sample 
All Firms Training No Training 
Mean Mean Mean 
Variables (S.O) (S.O) (S. O) 
-1 if 50\+ public .15841 .19047 .11244 
owned company 
-O otherwiee 
-1 if technological change .33828 .44537 .18473 
(new product or production 
proceee wae introduced) 
-O otherwiee 
Fraction of output .13150 .14067 .11835 
exported ( .205) ( .214) ( .191) 
Fraction of .11620 .11090 .12372 
temporary contracts ( .140) ( .118) ( .166) 
Temporary contracts/ .63943 .61816 .66994 
newly hired workers (.317) (.295) ( .346) 
Training contracts/ .16700 .20784 .10843 
newly hired ( .252) (.266) (.218) 
temporary workers 
Apprenticeship .01899 .01532 .02425 
contracts/newly hired ( .089) ( .071) ( .110) 
temporary workers 
Fraction of .08814 .10834 .05951 
high-level managers ( .104) ( .118) ( .071) 
Fraction of medium- .28623 .32594 .22992
"" and lower-1eve1 managers ( .208) ( .213) ( .188) 
Fraction of .08659 .09648 .07257 
clerical workers (.106) ( .116) (.090) 
Fraction of .53902 .46922 .63798 
production workers (.290) ( .292) (.257) 
Fraction of workers .16666 .19887 .12048 
eharing profit 
.09249 .13151 .03654 
rAppendix 1 (continued) 
Means and standard Oeviations of the Sample 
Al! Firms 
Mean 
Variables (5.0) 
Turnover rate = 
Hires + dismissa1/ .39688 
firm size (.534) 
-1 if CCOO holding 
majority at .34488 
bargaining table 
-1 if UGT holding .22937 
majority at  
bargaining tab1e 
Energy and Water .05280 
Mining and Chemica1 Ind. .16501 
Engineering .21122 
Other Manufacturing Ind. .22937 
Construction .02970 
Trade, Hotel and Repair .06765
'-
Transport and Communications .07095 
Finance and Insurance .15346 
Other Services .01980 
Note: A11 the variables concern the year 1988. 
Training No Training 
Mean Mean 
(5.0) (5.0) 
.36093 .44842 
( .402) ( .678) 
.35294 .33333 
.19887 .27309 
.05882 .04417 
.17927 .14457 
.22689 .18875 
.17647 .30522 
.01960 .04417 
.05322 .08835 
.06722 .07630 
.20448 .08032 
.01400 .02811 
